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ABSTRACT
In the literature, explanations of support for populist radical right (PRR) parties 
usually focus on voters’ socio-structural grievances, political discontent or policy 
positions. This article suggests an additional and possibly overarching explanation: 
societal pessimism. The central argument is that the nostalgic character of PRR 
ideology resonates with societal pessimism among its voters. Using European 
Social Survey data from 2012, the study compares levels of societal pessimism 
among PRR, radical left, mainstream left and mainstream right (MR) voters in 
eight European countries. The results show that societal pessimism is distributed 
in a tilted U-curve, with the highest levels indeed observed among PRR voters, 
followed by radical left voters. Societal pessimism increases the chance of a 
PRR vote (compared to a MR vote) controlling for a range of established factors. 
Further analyses show that societal pessimism is the only attitude on which MR 
and PRR voters take opposite, extreme positions. Finally, there is tentative evidence 
that societal pessimism is channelled through various more specific ideological 
positions taken by PRR voters, such as opposition to immigration.
KEYWORDS populist radical right; societal pessimism; nostalgia; voting behaviour
The rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties has been the focus of a compre-
hensive literature. There are three dominant approaches to explaining  support 
for these parties: economic grievances (socio-structural characteristics), cul-
tural grievances (especially opposition to immigration) and political discontent 
(or protest) (Ivarsflaten 2008; Oesch 2008; van der Brug et al. 2005). We propose 
that societal pessimism should be regarded as an additional and possibly over-
arching characteristic of PRR voters when explaining the electoral potential of 
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these parties. We argue that voters who are societally pessimistic are attracted 
to the nostalgic nature of the PRR (Betz and Johnson 2004). This feature of 
the PRR ideology, which is regularly mentioned by theorists but rarely stud-
ied empirically with respect to voters, is exemplified in the recurring notion 
that the best times are in the past (Taggart 2004). This reactionary turn is not 
restricted to the European far right; recently, Parker and Barreto (2014: 3) 
have noted how in the United States the Tea Party wishes to ‘turn the clock 
back’ to a point in time before their country was ‘being stolen from them’. In 
a similar vein, the US president, Donald Trump, who has also been described 
as populist (Inglehart and Norris 2016), habitually uses the nostalgic slogan 
‘Make America great again’. We argue that such nostalgia, which is based on 
the past, is attractive to societally pessimistic voters.
It is important to distinguish societal pessimism from grievances over per-
sonal circumstances, which are the focus of the ‘losers of (accelerating) globali-
sation’ thesis (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Citizens do not need to be personally 
disadvantaged (i.e. having egotropic concerns) to be worried about the direction 
of society (i.e. expressing sociotropic concerns). In most European countries, a 
large minority or the majority is pessimistic about society (Steenvoorden and 
van der Meer 2017). This can be defined as a concern that society is in decline. 
Rather than a mere extrapolation of egotropic concerns, societal pessimism 
is a characteristic of voters’ worldviews that cannot be explained by objective 
conditions alone; this concern is constituted by perceptions of unmanage-
able changes in Western societies and the alleged erosion of old certainties 
(Steenvoorden 2015).
PRR parties are attractive to citizens who are societally pessimistic, because 
they provide a clear vision of how society should change, namely returning to 
how it used to be before the social changes that have occurred in recent dec-
ades. The political programmes of these parties often aim to radically alter the 
political and societal status quo (Mudde 2007) in a way that seeks to ‘restore’ 
old social, ethno-cultural and political certainties (Duyvendak 2011; Ignazi 
1992, 2003; Mudde 2004), as in the ‘heartland’ (Taggart 2004). This heartland 
describes the ‘good old days’, which are romanticised and do not necessarily 
refer to how the past actually was. Despite the emphasis on this element of PRR 
ideology in theoretical contributions, no attempt has been made to empirically 
capture this attitude among voters. We argue and show that societal pessimism 
is indeed a robust and independent predictor of PRR voting. We also find that 
societal pessimism is distributed in a tilted U-curve, with higher levels among 
the radical left (RL) and PRR ends of the political spectrum, as well as among 
non-voters. It is particularly relevant when it comes to separating those who 
vote for PRR and mainstream right (MR) parties.
This adds to the understanding of PRR voting in several ways. First, by 
elaborating on the role of nostalgia and societal pessimism, we stress an under-
studied way in which party ideology and voter sentiment converge. Second, we 
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contribute to the literature by focusing on the differences between PRR voters 
and the electorate of one of its most important competitors – the MR (van 
der Brug et al. 2012). Third, the differentiating power of societal pessimism 
between MR and PRR voters adds to the understanding of an (emerging) new 
axis of political competition that is centred on the appreciation of risks in a 
rapidly globalising world, transcending old economic left and right dichotomies 
(Azmanova 2011; Kriesi et al. 2008).
Theory
The nostalgia of the populist radical right
In this article, we follow Mudde’s (2007) definition of PRR parties as nativist, 
authoritarian and populist. Although not at the forefront of the theorising on 
PRR voting, various authors point to a profound sense of nostalgia as a feature 
of the PRR ideology. Betz and Johnson (2004: 311) describe this ideology as 
‘a backward looking reactionary ideology, reflecting a deep sense of nostalgia 
for the good old days’. This is further elaborated on in Taggart’s concept of the 
‘heartland’ (Taggart 2004). In contrast to a utopia, the ‘heartland’ is not an ideal 
society that can be achieved in the future, but one that existed in the past and 
can be restored. As Taggart argues, however, this past is romanticised, with the 
heartland being an imaginary vision of the past, not a realistic perception. A 
central feature of the heartland is its ‘unitary nature’ (Taggart 2004: 278), which 
is driven by simplicity. This appears in populist discourse through appeals to 
‘the people’, which is a notion that parties often fail to specify further, but which 
clearly points to a culturally homogeneous country. This fits with the over-
all populist ideology, which presents political choices as political truths with 
clear rights and wrongs (Taggart 2004). This longing for a previous, imagined 
country in Western Europe is also signalled by Duyvendak, who refers to it as 
restorative nostalgia for a national home, which is instigated by globalisation 
and, in particular, the presence of immigrants: ‘the debate over “the stolen 
home” is deeply nostalgic. The past is portrayed as a closed and conflict-free 
whole, carried by citizens who all basically shared the same beliefs, norms and 
traditions’ (Duyvendak 2011: 85).
In a similar vein, Canovan (2004) discusses the distrust of populist parties 
of progress as portrayed by mainstream parties. All progressive initiatives, she 
argues, are advanced by a vanguard, which occupies a privileged status in soci-
ety. This state of affairs devalues the ‘opinions, beliefs and way of life of the mass 
of mankind’ (Canovan 2004: 246). Canovan characterises populists as being 
relatively suspicious of progress. A new way of doing things is not per se supe-
rior; instead, longstanding customs and traditions should be taken seriously. 
Similar to the heartland sentiment, we can label this distrust of progressive 
policies as backward-looking.
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The characterisation of far-right parties as the voice of a ‘silent counter-rev-
olution’ (Ignazi 1992, 2003) is another example of a longing for the past. The 
leftist rebellion of the 1960s has shifted dominant social, moral, legal and polit-
ical values in Western countries from conservative to progressive. Not all cit-
izens appreciated this shift, but the opposing, right-wing faction did not have 
a political actor to speak on its behalf until new right-wing parties emerged 
to fill this gap. Although Ignazi reserves the specific label ‘nostalgic’ for the 
older extreme right parties, which had a fascist ideology that the new extreme 
right does not, the silent counter-revolution can also more generally be seen 
as nostalgia for pre-revolution society.
Inglehart and Norris (2016) also stress that populist voting reflects a cultural 
backlash against the consolidation of post-material values. These authors note 
how Republican candidate Donald Trump’s slogan ‘Make America great again’ 
appeals nostalgically to a mythical ‘golden past’, especially for older white men, 
when American society was less diverse, U.S. leadership was unrivalled among 
Western powers during the Cold War era, threats of terrorism pre-9/11 were 
in distant lands but not at home, and conventional sex roles for women and 
men reflected patrimonial power relationships within the family and workforce. 
(Inglehart and Norris 2016: 16)
They argue that this nostalgia can also be heard among radical right parties 
in Europe.
It should be noted, however, that the different elements of this nostalgic 
heartland do not necessarily have to be shared among all PRR parties. On the 
contrary, it is argued that ‘a politics from the heartland is likely to be specific 
in context’ (Taggart 2004: 285). As an example, some PRR parties – especially 
in north-western Europe – have adopted the defence of freedom of speech and 
the emancipation of women as important values to be protected from the influx 
of ‘backward’ immigrants (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007). In contrast, PRR 
parties in Central-Eastern and Southern Europe place the traditional family 
centre stage in their view of the good old days, and in doing so define women’s 
emancipation or gay rights as corrupting elements (Mudde 2007). This suggests 
that it is the construction of this idealised past in the national context, not some 
fixed elements within it, which is shared among the PRR.
Intimately linked to the PRR’s nostalgia for a romanticised past is its con-
tinuing emphasis on the risks and challenges ahead, instead of on chances and 
opportunities. Pessimism about current changes in society is central to the 
political cleavage of ‘opportunity versus risk’ proposed by Azmanova (2011). 
On the one end of this new axis, both PRR and RL parties can be found to 
stress risks, while Liberal and the Green parties occupy the other end of the 
political spectrum and emphasise opportunities. This cleavage is generated 
by the ‘social impact of global economic integration’ (Azmanova 2011: 386) 
and divides society into groups that perceive either growing insecurities or 
increasing possibilities. This relates to the idea of the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of 
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globalisation (Betz 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008). Azmanova (2011) argues that the 
political mobilisation of the losers versus the winners restructures political 
competition, and that in the twenty-first century, the resulting risk-versus- 
opportunity axis is replacing the classic left–right alignment. At the centre of 
this axis is the perception of the risks that result from globalisation. These risks 
are clearly economic, but they are also cultural in the sense that open borders 
and European unification threaten citizens with a homogeneous conception 
of the nation state (Kriesi et al. 2008).
Summarising the characterisation of PRR parties in the literature, we can 
conclude that their nativist, authoritarian and populist agenda often takes 
shape in nostalgia as well as pessimism about current societal developments. 
Below, we discuss how this societal outlook is appealing to societally pessimistic 
citizens.
Societal pessimism
If PRR parties do indeed thrive on nostalgia for the past and pessimism about 
society’s future, this should be discernible in the attitudes of those who vote 
for them. In other words, we would expect there to be congruence between the 
PRR ideology and the attitudes of their electorate. We theorise that this attitude 
is societal pessimism. For societally pessimistic voters, a nostalgic vision is likely 
to be an attractive solution.
Although a large minority or a majority of citizens in Western countries 
can be labelled as societal pessimists (European Commission 2013; Gallup 
2014), this phenomenon has only been the subject of a few studies to date. 
Steenvoorden (2015) describes it as a concern that society is in decline and 
there is a collective powerlessness to change things for the better. Similarly, 
Bennett (2001) uses the term cultural pessimism to point to the feeling that 
one’s culture is in decline, while Elchardus and Smits (2007: 104) speak of ‘a 
lack of well-being [about being part of] society’. As the opposite of societal 
pessimism, social actualisation is the ‘evaluation of the potential and trajectory 
of society. This is the belief in the evolution of society and the sense that society 
has potential which is being realized through its institutions and citizens’ (Keyes 
1998: 122). In line with previous research, we define societal pessimism as a 
concern that society is in decline.
There is no research to date on the relationship between societal pessimism 
and PRR voting. A study on a range of attitudes on societal decline and pop-
ulist attitudes in Flanders does show that those are related (Elchardus and 
Spruyt 2016). Moreover, a study of ‘societal unease’, which is a more specific 
conceptualisation of concern about the state of society and correlates strongly 
(r  =  0.99) with broader societal pessimism, shows that this societal unease 
overlaps considerably with the PRR ideology. Steenvoorden (2015: 86) defines 
societal unease as ‘a latent concern about the precarious state of society’, which 
6   E. STEENVOORDEN AND E. HARTEVELD
is constituted by a perceived unmanageable deterioration of five fundamen-
tal aspects: the distrust of human capability, a loss of ideology, the decline of 
political power, the decline of community and socioeconomic vulnerability.
Clearly, all of these five elements are related to the PRR ideology. The 
distrust of human capability is very similar to the distrust of progress described 
by Canovan (2004). The loss of ideology (i.e. the loss of a vision of what society 
should be like among politicians) is responded to by the PRR in the form of the 
heartland (Taggart 2004). The decline of political power caused by globalisation 
and supranational influence (EU) is a central issue in the PRR’s insistence on 
returning power to the sovereign nation state. The decline of community is 
another feature of society today that PRR parties want to change by returning 
to the homogeneous heartland with re-established moral standards and cul-
tural homogeneity. Finally, a focus on (personal) socioeconomic vulnerability 
is increasingly a key feature of PRRs’ ideology (Rydgren 2012), and is in line 
with the loser-of-globalisation thesis and Azmanova’s (2011) risks-versus- 
opportunity axis of political mobilisation. However, socioeconomic vulnerabil-
ity in the case of societal unease reflects concern about the general insecurity 
experienced by many of the people in one’s country, not (per se) about oneself. 
This sociotropic form of concern about socioeconomic vulnerability is part of 
the call of some PRR parties for ‘de-globalisation’ (Mayer 2013).
As the concern about where society is heading (whether conceptualised 
as societal unease or societal pessimism) dovetails nicely with the nostalgic, 
pessimistic feature of the PRR ideology, this attitude can be seen as echoing the 
pessimism felt by the electorates of PRR parties. Moreover, we believe that the 
PRR’s nostalgia for an idealised past is an important pull factor for societally 
pessimistic voters, as a clear and familiar alternative to current society is pro-
vided, namely a promise to restore the country to former times, i.e. to when 
‘our’ country was still ‘our’ country. In this way, PRR parties offer a straightfor-
ward remedy for the current malaise. Consequently, our central hypothesis is 
the following: societal pessimism increases the chance of voting for a PRR party, 
independent of established explanatory variables.
Relation to established theories on populist radical right voting
How does societal pessimism differ from or relate to existing theories and 
evidence about the determinants of PRR voting? One common model of such 
voting is based on socio-structural characteristics. This assumes a ‘systematic link 
between voters’ class location and the parties they choose’ (Oesch 2012: 32). 
Indeed, several socioeconomic groups are clearly overrepresented in the elec-
torate of PRR parties, with the two most important being the ‘petit bourgeoisie’ 
and the ‘working classes’ (McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Rydgren 2012). PRR 
voters often work in particular sectors and occupations (Oesch 2008), gen-
erally have lower levels of education (Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2012), and are 
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more often the ‘losers of globalisation’ (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). Although the 
attention this model pays to voters’ appreciation of societal changes caused 
by globalisation is similar to our societal pessimism hypothesis, it emphasises 
personal and objective material conditions ‒ i.e. egotropic concerns. In contrast, 
the grievances that constitute societal pessimism include the perception of 
negative societal developments and can be referred to as sociotropic concerns.
Another approach stresses the protest element of a PRR vote. This explana-
tion holds that some voters express their discontent with the political system by 
voting for a populist party of whatever colour. Such parties usually emphasise 
charismatic leadership, which succeeds in mobilising voters against the elite. 
Indeed, PRR voters have been shown to have higher levels of distrust and 
dissatisfaction with the political system (Lubbers et al. 2002; McGann and 
Kitschelt 2005). The protest sentiment bears similarity to the negative percep-
tion inherent in societal pessimism. However, societal pessimism is a more 
diffuse concern about society overall, including but not restricted to concerns 
about the (political) elite.
A third approach assumes an ideological explanation for PRR voting (van 
der Brug et al. 2012). Opposition to immigration and immigrants – probably 
the core element of the PRR ideology – is widespread among large parts of 
the European electorate (Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2007). Voters who are 
strongly opposed to immigration will vote for a party that promises to reduce 
it. Authoritarianism and opposition to European integration are two other rel-
evant issues. Indeed, ideological agreement with PRR parties (on these issues) 
is usually by far the strongest predictor of PRR voting.
The societal pessimism hypothesis is clearly related to this approach, because 
it also explains PRR voting in terms of ideological congruence between parties 
and voters. Furthermore, the position of voters on immigration and European 
integration is likely to be related to societal pessimism. The former two are 
concrete concerns about specific societal issues, whereas societal pessimism is 
a more overarching, undirected concern. It is therefore likely that these opin-
ions are related and show some overlap in explaining PRR voting. Because 
societal pessimism is found to be the affective equivalent to societal unease 
(with a very strong correlation as described above), which is theorised to be a 
latent attitude, and empirically shown to be constituted by perceptions of rather 
abstract and broad social developments (Steenvoorden 2015), we expect that 
this characterisation also applies to societal pessimism. And as diffuse, latent 
attitudes are argued to be projected onto more concrete concerns and anxieties 
(Bauman 2006; Steenvoorden 2015), we expect that the more diffuse attitude 
of societal pessimism inspires grievances with regard to more specific issues, 
such as opposition to immigration and to European integration.
Therefore, we tentatively explore the extent to which societal pessimism is 
expressed through concerns such as these. To this end, we look into media-
tion between societal pessimism and PRR voting through the more concrete 
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attitudes we include in the analyses. Despite the limitations of our cross-sec-
tional data, which do not allow tests of causality, these explorations of medi-
ation provide more insight into the linkage between societal pessimism and 
PRR voting.
Data and method
We used the European Social Survey of 2012 (wave 6) to test our hypothesis. 
This offers measures of societal pessimism and all the established explanations 
for PRR voting. Using this dataset, we selected countries in which a PRR party 
is included in the questionnaire with a sufficient group of voters (>20). This 
resulted in the selection of respondents from eight Western European countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland.1 We acknowledge that these countries differ to various extents 
in terms of their political culture, political institutions and party ideologies. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to study all of these factors in 
depth, we do end the Results section with a brief investigation of the pattern 
of societal pessimism in individual countries.
Our dependent variable is the party a respondent indicates having voted 
for in the last national election. Due to the difference in the diversity of the 
electoral alternatives in each country (Evans 2005), as well as the finding that 
different variables distinguish PRR voters from other party families (Zhirkov 
2014), it would be an oversimplification to pool all other voters. As a result, 
we compare PRR voters to different relevant groups of voters, namely, those of 
RL, mainstream left (ML) and MR parties. The placement of parties in these 
categories follows the literature. Mudde’s categorisation and definition is the 
leading view in the context of PRR parties (2013),2 while we follow March and 
Rommerskirchen (2015) for the RL.3 The ML group consists of only social-dem-
ocratic parties. The MR, meanwhile, comprises both Christian-democratic and 
liberal-conservative parties, depending on which of the two was the largest in 
2012 in each country (the number of cases does not, unfortunately, allow us 
to further distinguish between them). As was the case with the PRR, the other 
parties also needed a sufficient number of voters (>20) to be included, which 
led to the exclusion of the RL in Belgium and Switzerland. Finally, we also 
investigated the group of non-voters, who are similar to PRR voters in many 
respects (Zhirkov 2014). Table 1 shows the parties that comprise the groups 
of RL, ML, MR and PRR parties, while Table 2 shows the number of voters for 
these parties in each country in the data.
The summary score of two items is used to measure societal pessimism: 
‘Hard to be hopeful about the future of the world’ and ‘For most people in 
this country, life is getting worse’. The answer options ranged from ‘Disagree 
strongly’ (1), via (3) ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, to ‘Agree strongly’ (5). There 
are various validations for the combinations of these two items. Aschauer (2016) 
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uses them to measure fear of societal decline, and they are also two of the three 
items of the measure of societal pessimism proposed by Steenvoorden (2015).4 
Furthermore, the first item shows a great deal of similarity with one used by 
Keyes for social actualisation (Keyes 1998; Keyes and Shapiro 2004), and one 
utilised for (a lack of) optimism (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner and Brown 2005), which 
we consider the opposite of social pessimism. These items adequately measure 
the core of societal pessimism, given that they capture a concern over society 
in general going in the wrong direction. The (polychoric) correlation between 
them is r = 0.48, which is not particularly high, but given that the first item has 
a very general scope while the second is more socioeconomic, this is not overly 
surprising. As it is important to include both elements in a measure of societal 
pessimism, using them both is the best option. In the summary scale of the 
two societal pessimism items higher values indicate more societal pessimism 
(M = 5.44; SD = 2.34).
Table 1. overview of parties per group and country.
Country Radical left
Mainstream  
left Mainstream right
Populist radical 
right
Belgium – socialist party  
Differently (sp.a)
christian-Democrati-
cand Flemish (cD&V)
Flemish interest 
(VB)
switzerland – social Democratic 
party
FDp. the liberals swiss people’s 
party (sVp)
Denmark red-Green alliance social Democrats Denmark’s liberal 
party (Venstre)
Danish people’s 
party (DF)
Finland left alliance (Vas) social Democratic 
party
national coalition 
party
true Finns (ps)
France left Front (FDG)/
radical left party 
(prG)
socialist party union for a popular 
Movement (uMp)
national Front (Fn)
the netherlands socialist party (sp) labour (pvda) people’s party for Free-
dom and Democracy 
(VVD)
party for Freedom 
(pVV)
norway socialist left party 
(Vas)
social Democrats conservative party 
(Høyre)
progress party 
(Frp)
sweden left party (Vp) social Democratic 
party
Moderate party sweden Demo-
crats (sD)
Table 2. number of respondents per party group and country.
Country Radical Left
Mainstream 
left
Mainstream 
right
Populist 
radical right Non-voters Total
Belgium – 143 195 47 175 560
switzerland – 187 123 181 414 905
Denmark 85 360 345 117 91 998
Finland 103 286 370 202 305 1266
France 111 459 358 126 375 1429
netherlands 142 352 361 96 291 1242
norway 71 436 305 132 188 1132
sweden 75 453 447 64 159 1198
total 587 2905 3137 1038 1998 8730
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As control variables, we include items that cover all of the usual approaches 
in explaining PRR voting. This enables us to provide as rigorous a test as possi-
ble of whether societal pessimism is indeed a factor of influence beyond these 
established factors in the literature. We control for socioeconomic status using 
the class scheme designed by Oesch (2008), namely: a higher-grade service 
class, a lower-grade service class, small business owners, skilled workers and 
unskilled workers. Furthermore, we include educational level (low, medium and 
high), a subjective item on ‘your place in society’ (0–10), an item on source of 
income (salary or profit versus pension, unemployment benefit, other benefit or 
other source) and one about the level of income (household’s total net income, 
in 10 categories). The protest approach is operationalised to a less satisfactory 
level, because we have only one item, namely, ‘how satisfied [are you] with the 
way democracy works in [your] country’ (0–10). Nonetheless, we consider this 
to be an acceptable measure of the protests about the political system overall. 
The models also include the most important issues in the literature on the 
ideological position of PRR voters, i.e. immigration, European integration and 
authoritarianism. For the respondents’ standpoint on immigration, we use a 
summary score of three items (‘immigration [is] bad or good for a country’s 
economy’, ‘a country’s cultural life [is] undermined or enriched by immigrants’, 
‘immigrants make a country a worse or better place to live’, all reversed). One 
item measures support for European integration (reversed) and one support for 
authoritarianism (‘[it is] important to do what [one] is told and follow rules’). 
As we also specifically examine the differences between MR and PRR voting, 
we also include a variable on income differences (‘government should reduce 
differences in income levels’).
We examined the bivariate correlations to check the interrelatedness of these 
attitudes with societal pessimism. Societal pessimism correlates weakly with 
authoritarianism (0.02), European integration (0.18) and income differences 
(0.22) and moderately with immigration (0.33) and satisfaction with democracy 
(0.38). This suggests that, as expected, societal pessimism is related to, but not 
identical to, the usual explanations for PRR voting. We standardised all the 
(scales of) attitudinal items (the variables on societal pessimism, satisfaction 
with democracy, immigration, European integration, income differences and 
authoritarianism) to facilitate the interpretation of the figures and the compar-
ison of effect sizes in the models.
As societal pessimism is a sociotropic attitude, it should not originate exclu-
sively in an individual’s personality or happiness. This is a consistent finding in 
the few studies that exist on societal pessimism or social discontent (Eckersley 
2000, 2013; Elchardus and Smits 2007; Kroll and Delhey 2013; Steenvoorden 
2015). Indeed, we find a moderate relationship between societal pessimism and 
happiness (0.31) and a slightly higher correlation with life satisfaction (0.33). 
We use the item on life satisfaction (scale 0–10) in the models to exclude the 
influence of personally oriented pessimism.
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Finally, sociodemographic control variables are also included: gender, age, 
a squared term for age, whether people live in (the suburbs of) a large city ver-
sus (a town in) the countryside, level of religiosity (‘How often do you attend 
religious services apart from special occasions’, ranging from 1 to 7: never to 
every day) and political interest (‘How interested in politics’, reversed).
As we compare categories of voters, we use multinomial regression analy-
ses, with PRR voters as the reference category. All the data is pooled to gain 
statistical power, and country dummies are included to eliminate all cross- 
national variations. In the follow-up analyses, in which we focus on the differ-
ence between PRR and MR voters, we use logistic regression analyses including 
country dummies. We show y-standardised effects in Table 4, which enables 
a comparison of effect sizes across logistic models. Such a comparison is not 
possible with normal logistic coefficients.
All models use listwise deletion. In the eight countries, a total of 8637 
respondents vote for one of the four party families under study. Including 
all covariates in the full model (model 2 in Table 4) decreases our N to 7331 
respondents (85%; 3419 respondents when comparing only PRR and MR). 
A replication of intermediate models with this smaller subsample does not 
produce substantially different results.
Results
Societal pessimism across political party categories
Figure 1 shows that PRR voters stand out as being the most societally pessi-
mistic, with only non-voters scoring at a similar level. The next highest score 
is that of the RL, followed by the ML group, while the MR voters are the least 
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Figure 1. Distribution of societal pessimism across party categories.
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pessimistic. The pattern in Figure 1 seems to suggest a tilted U-curve, with 
the highest levels of societal pessimism in the PRR and RL electorates, as well 
as non-voters. Although the RL voters are not nearly as societally pessimistic 
as PRR voters, and the difference between the RL and ML is not significant at 
the 5% level, the relatively high level of societal pessimism among RL voters 
is remarkable. This fits the assumption that political mobilisation is increas-
ingly determined by the perception of risks versus opportunities in a globalised 
world, resulting in a political axis on which the RR and RL parties can be placed 
at one extreme and the MR (and Green parties) at the other (Azmanova 2011).
Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Figure 1. First, societal 
pessimism sets PRR voters apart from all other voters. This seems to confirm 
a congruence between the nostalgic ideology of PRR parties and the societal 
pessimism of their electorate. Second, societal pessimism is a characteristic 
that above all separates PRR voters from MR voters.
Explaining populist radical right voting with societal pessimism
The next question is whether these conclusions hold in a multivariate model. 
Table 3 reports the direction and significance of the societal pessimism varia-
ble in several multinomial logistic regressions of voting for the party groups, 
with the PRR as the reference category (Appendix 1 Table A1 shows the full 
model). In the first row of the table, societal pessimism is the only explana-
tory variable (other than country dummies). This shows that all other voters, 
as well as non-voters, are significantly less societally pessimistic compared to 
PRR voters. Predicted probabilities show that societal pessimism significantly 
increases the probability of voting for a PRR party from 7.7% for those with low 
societal pessimism (‒1 standard deviation) to 14.9% for those with high societal 
pessimism (+1 SD). Clearly, then, societal pessimism is a strong predictor of 
voting for a PRR party.
In the second row, basic control variables (gender, age, age2, urbanisation, 
religiosity and political interest, satisfaction with life) and socioeconomic var-
iables (social class, educational level, subjective position in society, source of 
income and level of income) are added. Under these controls, PRR voters con-
tinue to stand out as being more societally pessimistic than all other voters. 
Table 3. explaining prr voting with sets of explanations.a
asignificant negative effect in all cases at p < .05 (two sided tests).
  Radical left Mainstream left Mainstream right Non-voters
societal pessimism only – – – –
societal pessimism + 
socio-demographics
– – – –
societal pessimism + 
attitudes
x x – x
Full model x x – x
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This means that demographic and socioeconomic factors do not confound the 
correlation between societal pessimism and voting for the various party groups.
The third row shows the results of a model that includes societal pessimism 
and attitudes towards a range of issues (immigration, European integration, sat-
isfaction with democracy, authoritarianism, income differences and satisfaction 
with life). The difference between the PRR and left-wing voters (both radical 
and mainstream), as well as non-voters, is no longer significant. However, the 
effect of societal pessimism continues to hold for the difference between the 
MR and PRR.
The fourth row shows that, when controlling for all the covariates, societal 
pessimism still significantly distinguishes PRR from MR voters, but not from 
voting for other parties or not voting. The effect of societal pessimism is now 
smaller: societal pessimism increases the probability of voting for a PRR party 
from 10.6% for those low in societal pessimism (‒1 standard deviation) to 11.7% 
for those high in societal pessimism (+1 SD, all other covariates kept at their 
actual value). Nevertheless, societal pessimism is a robust and independent 
factor that distinguishes PRR from MR voters. This is especially interesting 
because, with respect to other attitudes such as intolerance towards immi-
grants, both the MR and PRR voters as well as parties are relatively similar. 
Consequently, in the next section we focus on the difference between those 
two groups of voters.
Zooming in: populist radical right versus mainstream right voters
We now turn to a closer investigation of the role played by societal pessimism 
in guiding voters to PRR parties rather than the MR. Figure 2 shows the dis-
tribution of six (standardised) scores on attitudinal variables across RL, ML, 
MR and PRR voters, as well as those who do not vote. As concluded above, 
the groups that differ most with regard to their level of societal pessimism are 
the MR and PRR voters (closely followed by non-voters). In contrast, in terms 
of other attitudes that are important predictors of PRR voting, MR and PRR 
voters are not at opposite extremes. In the case of satisfaction with democracy, 
PRR voters adopt an extreme (dissatisfied) position, while MR voters do not. 
On issues of immigration and the importance of following rules, PRR voters 
again hold extreme positions, but MR voters are the next most concerned group. 
On income differences, those voting for the MR take an extreme (favourable) 
position, but PRR voters do not. The pattern of the EU integration issue is most 
similar to that of societal pessimism, except MR and ML voters take the same 
position here. As a result, we can conclude that societal pessimism is the only 
attitude on which MR and PRR voters stand out as opposite extremes.
This does not, however, prove that societal pessimism is the best differenti-
ator between these two electorates. To reach conclusions on this point, Table 4 
shows the results of a logistic regression on MR and PRR voters, which is the 
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detailed outcome of the final row in Table 3 for these two groups (Appendix 2 
Table A2 includes country dummies). In order to be able to compare the coef-
ficients of the two logistic models, we used the so-called y-standardisation 
method (Winship and Mare 1984), which fixes the variance of the error term. 
Model 1 (with all the variables except societal pessimism) shows that PRR voters 
are more often male, less well educated, employed in lower-grade services or are 
(un)skilled workers than their MR counterparts. They also earn less and attend 
religious gatherings more often. Furthermore, PRR voters are less satisfied with 
democracy and more concerned about immigration and European integration. 
All of these findings are in line with earlier studies on PRR voting.
In model 2, we added societal pessimism. This has a smaller effect (0.06) 
than attitudes on European integration (0.17) and immigration (0.24), but the 
differences with respect to satisfaction with democracy (0.10) and income dif-
ferences (0.08) are small. Furthermore, comparing models 1 and 2 shows that 
all other variables retain their significance (except for place in society, which 
was already on the edge of significance). In terms of effect sizes, there are only 
very small changes in model 2 compared to model 1. This means that it is safe 
to conclude that societal pessimism explains PRR voting in addition to and 
independent from other factors.
Radical Left
Mainstream Left
Mainstream Right
Populist Radical Right
Non-voter
Figure 2. Distribution of six attitudes related to prr voting.
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The explained variance does not increase much, from 27.8% in model 1 to 
28.1% in model 2, which means that societal pessimism does not offer a large 
direct increase in explained variance compared to the existing explanatory var-
iables. On the other hand, in terms of predicted probabilities, a rise in societal 
pessimism from ‒1 to +1 SD in societal pessimism significantly increases the 
probability of PRR voting (among voters of the right) from 25.0% to 29.2%, 
which is not negligible. As the increase in R2 brought about by societal pessi-
mism is larger when the other variables are not included, it appears that societal 
pessimism shares explained variance with these other indicators. This, in turn, 
suggests that societal pessimism manifests itself through the more concrete 
attitudes in the model.
Although the cross-sectional data do not allow such causal claims to be 
made, we tentatively investigate this possibility with hierarchical regressions. 
The results are summarised in Figure 3, where bars indicate the effect size of 
Table 4. Mainstream right versus populist radical right voting.a
alogistic regression, coefficients are y-standardised.
*p < 0.05; 
**p < 0.01; 
***p < 0.001; N = 3419.
Demographic characteristics Model 1 Model 2
Gender (ref: male) 0.27*** 0.27***
age 0.01 0.01
age2 0.00 0.00
city 0.00 −0.00
religious attendance 0.11*** 0.11***
socioeconomic characteristics
educational level (ref: medium)
  •  less well educated 0.20** 0.20***
  •  highly educated −0.20*** −0.20**
class (ref: higher grade services)
  •  lower-grade services 0.10 0.09
  •  small business owners 0.06 0.05
  •  skilled workers 0.28*** 0.28***
  •  unskilled workers 0.32*** 0.31***
place in society −0.03* −0.03
income source (ref: salary)
  •  pension −0.01 −0.01
  •  unemployment benefit 0.12 0.12
  •  other benefit 0.14 0.14
  •  other −0.11 −0.09
level of income −0.03** −0.02**
Attitudinal characteristics
political interest −0.04 −0.04
satisfaction with democracy −0.11*** −0.10***
opposition to eu integration 0.17*** 0.17***
opposition to immigration 0.25*** 0.24***
importance attached to following rules 0.00 0.00
reducing income differences 0.09*** 0.08***
satisfaction with life −0.01 0.01
societal pessimism 0.06**
pseudo R2 (McFadden’s) 28.4% 29.4%
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societal pessimism. Societal pessimism seems partly mediated by two attitudes: 
opposition to European integration and opposition to immigration. This is 
tentative evidence that societal pessimism is projected onto these two more 
concrete issues, which have earlier been identified as predictors of PRR vot-
ing. Research with an experimental or panel design is warranted to further 
substantiate this.
Societal pessimism in individual countries
In Figure 4, as a robustness check, we examine the distribution of societal pes-
simism per country and party category. This shows that the (tilted) U-curve is 
not equally present in all nations. Societal pessimism is most clearly correlated 
with PRR voting in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. 
Indeed, in these countries, it sets PRR voters significantly apart from main-
stream voters. Societal pessimism is somewhat less obvious among PRR voters 
in Belgium, Switzerland and France. In short, it appears that societal pessimism 
is a clear predictor of PRR voting in the Nordic countries (and the Netherlands), 
and to a lesser extent in the (mainly Catholic) nations of Belgium, Switzerland 
and France. This pattern remains after controlling.
A possible explanation can be found in the extent to which public opinion, as 
well as the political culture, is generally characterised by culturally progressive 
values. In the Nordic countries (and to some degree in the Netherlands), the 
‘silent revolution’ has been most clearly consolidated in terms of both support 
Figure 3. effect size of societal pessimism with single attitudes added (models Mr versus 
prr voting).
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for and the actual institutionalisation of post-material issues such as gender 
equality. This creates more space for political actors to mobilise on nostalgia 
against such developments. In contrast, the post-material ‘silent revolution’ 
might have been weakened by the Catholic Church in France (and to a lesser 
degree in Belgium).
Although the reasons for these country differences remain speculative, the 
pattern at least suggests that the degree and nature of the rise of post-material 
values conditions the extent to which PRR parties can mobilise nostalgia for 
a pre-revolution society. This does not preclude other countries experiencing 
the rise of successful PRR parties (which they do), but it does suggest that these 
PRR parties attract voters for different reasons.
Conclusion and discussion
In this article, we propose that societal pessimism is a defining characteristic 
of PRR voters, independent from established determinants of PRR voting. We 
argue that for those who are societally pessimistic, PRR parties match their soci-
etal outlook and offer a solution by suggesting a return to the (idealised) past.
We find that PRR voters are indeed the most societally pessimistic group of 
voters in the eight European countries studied. Furthermore, societal pessimism 
relates to the general dimension of political competition in a tilted U-curve. 
The highest levels of societal pessimism can be found among PRR parties (and, 
Radical Left
Mainstream Left
Mainstream Right
Populist Radical Right
Non-voter
Figure 4. societal pessimism per country and party category.
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to a lesser extent, the RL and non-voters), while the least societally pessimistic 
are the MR voters. This pattern, whereby radical parties cater to the societally 
pessimistic while mainstream parties attract relatively optimistic voters, fits 
Azmanova’s (2011) positioning of political parties on a risk‒opportunity axis. 
This not only means that societal pessimism is an attitude that is politically 
relevant, but also that it is a characteristic of an important political cleavage.
Furthermore, the results show that, when controlling for socio-structural 
indicators, societal pessimism significantly reduces the likelihood of voting 
for any party – RL, ML or MR – as well as not voters compared to PRR voters. 
In a full model, with both socioeconomic and attitudinal factors that match 
the policy and protest explanations for PRR voting, societal pessimism only 
remains a significant determinant of MR versus PRR voting. This finding is 
even more interesting, because these two parties are important electoral com-
petitors. Societal pessimism also turns out to be the only attitude in the data 
on which MR and PRR voters are extreme, opposing groups. It can thus be 
concluded that societal pessimism is an additional explanation of PRR voting, 
which is triggered by the pessimistic outlook of PRR parties (Azmanova 2011) 
and their solution in the form of turning back the clock several decades to the 
idealised past (Canovan 2004; Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2004). Finally, 
besides having a direct effect on mainstream versus PRR voting, the data suggest 
that societal pessimism might be mediated by opposition to both European 
integration and immigration. With the reservation that testing mediation is 
not possible with the cross-sectional data used here, this tentatively suggests 
that these electorally relevant differences between the voters of the two party 
families find part of their origin in their different levels of societal pessimism.
The results indicate the need for further inquiry into the role of societal 
pessimism among PRR parties and their electorate. The element of nostalgia in 
the PRR ideology deserves more empirical scrutiny, for instance by examining 
PRR manifestos across both countries and elections. Second, by showing that 
societal pessimism is a defining element separating PRR and MR voters, we 
provide evidence for the development of a new axis of political competition 
centring on the appreciation of the risks in a rapidly globalising world, tran-
scending the old left–right mobilisation (Azmanova 2011).
More research into the relationship between societal pessimism and RL vot-
ing, in terms of these parties’ ideologies and the attitudes of their electorates, is 
also warranted, given that these voters show the second highest level of societal 
pessimism. Although some RL parties have been labelled populist (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2013), more research is needed to examine whether the RL ideology 
includes nostalgia and pessimism. Furthermore, it is important to investigate 
whether societal pessimism among radical parties of the right and the left is 
similar or instead differs in its object.
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At the same time, while many citizens are societally pessimistic, not all of 
them vote for the RR (or RL). The precise conditions under which sociotropic 
concerns are expressed in a radical vote – for instance, in combination with 
specific egotropic precarious conditions – is an interesting topic for further 
research. Highly educated but societally pessimistic voters might, for instance, 
turn to Green parties rather than the PRR for an alternative. Furthermore, 
cross-national differences between PRR voters deserve more in-depth exami-
nation to further study the conditions under which societal pessimism affects 
PRR voting.
Finally, future research could consider whether and how PRR support in 
turn increases societal pessimism. Research shows not only that elite cues from 
the political leaders of one’s party affect societal attitudes (Lenz 2009; Meffert et 
al. 2006; Slothuus 2015), but also that voting behaviour and attitudes affect one 
another, resulting in a spiral of increasingly polarised stances between groups 
of voters (Harteveld et al. 2015). This means that PRR voting incites a spiral of 
increasing societal pessimism, probably deepening the risk‒opportunity axis 
of political competition.
Notes
1.  In Germany, Italy and Slovenia, fewer than 20 respondents voted for the PRR 
parties. Although including Hungary does not substantially affect the results, we 
excluded that country from the analyses because Jobbik is seen in the literature 
as an extreme right party, rather than a PRR party (Mudde 2013).
2.  We also included the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in Norway. Although 
this party is defined by Mudde (2007: 47) as non-radical right populist, which 
is a category that is ‘closely related to the populist radical right’ because of its 
nativism, it has been labelled as radical right by other authors (Norris 2005).
3.  An exception is Denmark, where two potential RL parties exist, the Red‒Green 
Alliance and the Socialist People’s Party (SF) (March and Rommerskirchen 
2015). Including them both results in the strong dominance of Denmark (226 
of 728) in the RL category. We included the Red‒Green Alliance because it 
scores as more leftist on a left–right scale (March and Rommerskirchen 2015), 
and because the ideology of the SF resembles aspects of Green parties (as their 
membership in the European Greens indicates). As voters of Green parties are 
assumed to be least risk-oriented, just like liberals (Azmanova 2011), the SF is 
not a typical RL party in that respect.
4.  The third was: ‘Do you consider the Netherlands to be heading in the wrong 
or in the right direction?’
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Appendix 2
Table A2.  Mainstream right versus populist radical right voting, including country 
 dummies.
 Demographic characteristics Model 1 Model 2
Gender (ref: male) 0.27** 0.27***
age 0.01 0.01
age2 0.00 0.00
city 0.00 −0.00
religious attendance 0.11** 0.11**
Socioeconomic characteristics
educational level (ref: medium)
•  less well educated 0.20** 0.20**
•  highly educated −0.20** −0.20**
class (ref: higher grade services)
•  lower-grade services 0.10 0.09
•  small business owners 0.06 0.05
•  skilled workers 0.28** 0.28**
•  unskilled workers 0.32** 0.31**
•  place in society −0.03 −0.03
income source (ref: salary)
•  pension −0.01 −0.01
•  unemployment benefit 0.12 0.12
•  other benefit 0.14 0.14
•  other −0.11 −0.09
level of income −0.03** −0.02
Attitudinal characteristics
political interest −0.04 −0.04
satisfaction with democracy −0.11** −0.10**
opposition to eu integration 0.17** 0.17**
opposition to immigration 0.25** 0.24**
importance attached to following rules 0.00 0.00
income differences 0.09** 0.08**
satisfaction with life −0.01 −0.01
societal pessimism 0.06
Country (Belgium)
switzerland 1.17** 1.17**
Denmark 0.41** 0.42*
Finland 0.70** 0.70**
France 0.06 0.03
netherlands 0.23 0.22
norway 0.55** 0.58**
sweden 0.04 0.06
pseudo R2 28. 4% 29.4%
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; N = 3419, no constant presented because these are y-standardised 
coefficients.
